A Review of the Security of Insulin Pump Infusion Systems

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1. Abstract

Insulin therapy has enabled diabetic patients to maintain blood glucose control to lead healthier lives. Today, rather than manually injecting insulin using syringes, a patient can use a device, such as an insulin pump, to programmatically deliver insulin. This allows for more granular insulin delivery while attaining blood glucose control. The insulin pump system features have increasingly benefited patients, but the complexity of the resulting system has grown in parallel. As a result security breaches that can negatively affect patient health are now possible.

Rather than focus on the security of a single device, we concentrate on protecting the security of the entire system. In this paper we describe the security issues as they pertain to an insulin pump *system* that includes an embedded system of components including the insulin pump, continuous glucose management system, blood glucose monitor, and other associated devices (e.g., a mobile phone or personal computer). We detail not only the growing wireless communication threat in each system component, but we also describe additional threats to the system (e.g., availability and integrity). Our goal is to help create a trustworthy infusion pump system that will ultimately strengthen pump safety, and we describe mitigating solutions to address identified security issues both for now and in the future.

2. Introduction

In the past decade, numerous pump features have significantly helped with attainment of better glycemic control including immediate and longer duration boluses, continuous glucose monitors, tighter programmatic basal rate control, and increased connectivity with other insulin pump system components. All of these features help achieve better A1C values, and

patients have greatly benefited. Unfortunately, while the clinical benefits of these devices have increased, new safety risks have also emerged. New features bring increased complexity within the system, and it is becoming more difficult to assess safety and information security. From 2005 to 2009, there were 56,000 adverse events in infusion pump systems (the total number of affected systems is unknown) with 45% of those adverse events attributed to insulin pumps [1, 2].

The rest of this paper addresses the security of the insulin pump systems in order to avoid more problematic issues in the future. Our approach is motivated by the patient's goal: to maintain a euglycemic blood glucose level. We wish to protect against a breach in insulin pump system security that could result in hyperglycemia or hypoglycemia. While patients should continue to use their current systems as the current benefits far outweigh the risks, as with other classes of medical devices [3], secure insulin pump system designs are needed now. There exists evidence of past, willful harm to patients (e.g., Tylenol bottles contaminated with cyanide and animated, seizure-inducing images posted on epilepsy support websites). We must ensure that similar risks do not arise for insulin pump system patients.

We define an insulin pump system in this article as a FDA class II system of components which contains an insulin pump and any other device that may directly interact with or indirectly be used with the insulin pump device. This definition differs from the FDA's definition of an infusion pump system (e.g., issued in April 2010 concerning infusion pump premarket notification [4]) in that it includes devices which do not directly connect with the insulin pump, and it does not include any part of the infusion set. In some insulin pump systems, there is an insulin pump, a wireless insulin pump remote control, a (wireless) glucose monitor that is used to check the patient's blood glucose, and a continuous glucose monitoring system (CGM) which continuously provides glucose data to the insulin pump.

Figure 1 depicts an example insulin pump system. Older systems had isolated devices that were incapable of wireless communication. As time progressed, newer systems added communication to components, and once isolated non-communicating components can now bi-directionally communicate with the insulin pump or with each other.

There are essentially two types of currently deployed insulin pump system models: tubed and tubeless (i.e., "patch pumps"). The tubed pumps have the insulin pump worn external to the body not necessarily in contact with the body; the pump contains a reservoir of insulin that is pumped through a tube that connects to the body subcutaneously via a cannula. In the last decade, patch pump architecture has been introduced [5, 6]; it eliminates the long tubing of the tubed architecture by its direct attachment to the body. We differentiate between these two designs, because their architectural differences fundamentally affect the way one approaches security.

3. Solutions under a risk-management approach

In February 2010, we discovered certain insulin pump system vulnerabilities stemming from unauthorized wireless accesses and notified the FDA. Since that time, we have been working to solve the identified problem areas: (1) ensuring remote control is done by pre-approved individuals (i.e., the patient or patient's physician), (2) maintaining the integrity of glucose data (i.e., detecting changes to measured glucose results), (3) maintaining integrity of system settings, (4) addressing system communication availability, (5) ensuring software has not been undetectably altered, and (6) enhancing safety of new wireless consumer devices (e.g., a mobile phone). While many problem areas can be addressed with existing security mechanisms, adequately addressing identified threats for all stakeholders is challenging. In some cases, novel research is needed to mitigate the risk. In each proposed solution, our goal

is not only to design a secure technical solution but also to avoid impeding safety and effectiveness. In addition to safety and security, other factors that must be addressed are:

I. **User acceptance.** The patient and health care workers should be able to use the system in a way that derives its full clinical benefit while maximizing the quality of life for the patient. Any hindrance to the patient's or physician's use of a component of the system must be carefully analyzed for its impact on the patient.
II. **User environment.** The insulin pump system is made unique by the patient's high amount of interaction with the system. Different user environments directly affect patient interactions in safety and device effectiveness. A solution must account for different patient environments (e.g., public transit versus home environment).
III. **Resource constraints.** As we miniaturize system components, power and computational constraints become more important. Because current insulin pump systems are external to the body and can easily receive renewable power (e.g., change the battery), they are not as resource-constrained as other medical device systems. Judiciously using resources can affect the patient's quality of life (e.g., not having to recharge a battery as often), and every system must balance these constraints for patient security and safety.
IV. **Effectiveness.** A newly introduced security feature should strengthen safety, but it could affect the clinical effectiveness of the device. There may be a less secure solution that increases device effectiveness with acceptable risk.

Inadequately addressing any one of these factors can negatively affect safety. Thus, a derived requirement is that the system adequately meets these criteria while balancing safety. For instance, any change to an existing system should be as usable as a current system.

4. Categorized security challenges through a risk-based analysis

We now detail some of the potential security vulnerabilities posed in *current* insulin pump systems and recommend approaches to mitigate these issues. We note that each vulnerability affects key security properties including availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and authorization (see Table 1). Data integrity, which means to ensure that all changes (both unintentional and intentional) to data are detected, was a main focus of a recent FDA presentation at the Tenth Annual Diabetes Technology Meeting in Bethesda, Maryland [7]. During his presentation Paul Jones explained how addressing integrity of wireless communications addresses a main security concern that presents a high potential risk. Similarly, we direct our attention to areas that present the most risk to patient safety by the compromise of one of these key security properties.

Below, we highlight security issues in each specific device category by describing how we have reached our current state and then detailing where we are now. We will end by describing where future security challenges exist and detail some steps to mitigate these issues now, in the short-term, and in the future.

Category 1: Insulin pumps. New wireless features of insulin pump systems have introduced additional complexity and potential vulnerabilities. The security challenges posed by wireless connectivity are of particular concern. An unauthorized third-party can interfere with pump communication and undermine patient safety (we confirmed this through laboratory experiments by sending commands to an insulin pump using an unauthorized remote programmer at a distance of 100 ft. [8]). In addition to the wireless pump communication, the device's software integrity is equally important (software should not undetectably be altered). Thus, the specifically identified issues are a security breach that could result in (1) changing already-issued wireless pump commands, (2) generating unauthorized wireless pump

commands, (3) remotely changing the software or settings on the device, and (4) denying communication with the pump device.

Category 2: Blood Glucose Monitor (BGM). In the past, BGMs were typically used as a way of telling a patient the current blood glucose level. Today, they are additionally used to wirelessly transmit a blood glucose value to the pump or, although not as widespread, to calibrate the continuous blood glucose monitor. Through the additional features of calibration and communication, BGMs are an increasingly important and trusted component of the insulin pump system. Currently deployed systems enable pump and BGM interaction and BGM and personal computer (PC) interaction. Consequences of a security breach may include (1) changes of glucose levels from the BGM to the pump via the communication channel, (2) changes of glucose levels from the BGM to the PC via the communication channel, and (3) changes to the BGM software by a PC.

Changing the BGM software is more speculative. BGMs currently interact with desktop computers on a regular basis to allow a patient to use data analysis tools on their blood glucose values. Unfortunately, the interface between a BGM and PC could be compromised (e.g., through a computer virus). This particular communication sheds light on a different interface: the interface between two peripheral components (i.e., the BGM and PC), and this interface shows the increased complexity and associated security issue between these components.

Category 3: Continuous Glucose Monitor (CGM). By the inclusion of wireless functionality in the insulin pump system, many pump patients have a network of devices on their person throughout the day. One of the most important devices within the insulin pump system is the CGM. Because insulin dosage may be changed based on monitor-reported blood glucose measurements, similar security challenges exist in this device including the

possibility that a security break that will: (1) alter wirelessly transmitted blood glucose values; or 2) generate records of new glucose values de novo and then transmit them wirelessly.

Category 4: Peripheral components. While we have already addressed some of these issues about mobile devices in the past [9], peripheral component risk is increasing. Currently deployed peripheral devices which are increasingly being integrated into the insulin pump system include the PC and mobile phone. A new concept car that displays real-time blood glucose values in its dash shows that any device could be included in an insulin pump system [10, 11]; we note that each device presents a potential threat to safety and security. For the PC, we must protect against a breach in (1) changed insulin pump settings, (2) alteration of existing blood glucose data values, (3) insertion of new blood glucose data values, and (4) transmission of blood glucose data values. The PC is an integral part of a patient's toolset to understand their glycemic values. Current patient benefits outweigh the risks of using such a device, but changes are necessary to increase patient safety both from intentional and unintentional harm.

We note that the described areas do not apply to all insulin pump systems, but they are representative of currently deployed systems. Future insulin pump systems including closed loop artificial pancreas systems, are susceptible to similar issues and present new challenges, but we omit those systems for brevity. Fortunately, many of the identified areas have solutions that may simply need vetting by relevant stakeholders (i.e., primarily patients and physicians) while some are more difficult and require novel research. The FDA has already begun encouraging insulin pump manufacturers to start addressing security in their product designs [7, 12, 13], and we look forward to the FDA's future guidance in insulin pump system security. We now detail mitigating ways to address security in currently deployed systems.

5. Mitigating solutions

For faster deployment of potential solutions, we highlight some approaches here.

Pump and component interaction. Wireless functionality is a key feature that has introduced much of the identified issues. While this is a necessary and important feature (for current CGMs, the artificial pancreas, and general improvement on the quality of the patient's life), simple changes can greatly increase patient safety.

For example, if a pump always has a fail-safe physical interface for the patient (e.g., programming can be done without a remote), then the patient will retain pump control if a remote programmer is lost, stolen, or wireless communication is interrupted. For a patch pump, a simple tactile button on the device itself could be used to *enable* wireless communication for a short period of time. When that period of time expires, the pump can no longer communicate wirelessly with the programmer. By temporarily disabling wireless communication, this protects against abuses where the battery is intentionally drained through its wireless communication interface.

To augment this safety feature, one could additionally use a physical feature to completely disable remote control wireless communication. This would require a physical interface on the pump to allow control until wireless communication could be restored (e.g., at a minimum, allow the starting and stoppage of insulin delivery and immediate insulin delivery). This may be useful to avoid unintentional message interference in environments with heavy wireless activity.

Continuous wireless communication presents a more challenging issue, and presents a new problem for the artificial pancreas. This device will rely on continuous reliable CGM transmission of glucose levels. Interruption of CGM data transmission would be highly problematic.

An unaddressed aspect of patient therapy is system alarms – an issue that affects patient acceptance and is influenced by the patient's environment. An alarm event should be able to attain the patient's attention. Hypoglycemic patients do not respond well to auditory alarms [14], and a dual-mode alarm may be necessary (e.g., auditory and vibratory). One possibility for future pumps is to have the phone listen to system communication (e.g., CGM to pump). Even if messages were encrypted, certain data transmission patterns may indicate a problem, and the phone could alert the user. This assumes that the phone cannot understand but can detect system communication, and it assumes an acceptable level of risk. Additional risk lies in using the phone as an alarm where rogue software could intentionally mute alarms or raise spurious alarms. To increase safety, an alarm system may need two independent components (e.g., phone plus pump).

Confidentiality. In addition to wireless communication and device service interruption, confidentiality remains an issue. Common encryption standards like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) provide a foothold for an acceptable solution. While issues with key management exist within a specific vendor's system (e.g., initial device pairings and pairing new devices), this requires vendors to work more closely together. Today, an insulin pump system may involve several companies and their associated devices, and manufacturers will need to share keys without overburdening patients. This should be an easier technical problem, but it should be vetted for usability.

While encryption helps to provide a solution, it could inhibit emergency medical staff needing access to patient data [15]. An easy solution is to provide a physical pump interface (e.g., a physician presses a physical tactile button for the needed data). If a physical pump interface is not acceptable, then a novel solution will be needed for accessing this information (e.g., using an infrared port which interfaces to a reader).

Peripheral components. We now discuss potential solutions for peripheral components by considering a personal computer (PC). The PC can now change insulin pump settings, and many patients use a computer to graph their data. Unfortunately, maintaining PC integrity is the goal of a multi-billion dollar anti-virus industry, and this goal has been (yet) unrealized. Ensuring integrity may require novel computer science research to provide a safe environment for patients.

The use of an untrustworthy peripheral component presents a more recent challenge in a medical device system. We are now tasked with building a safe system from less safe parts. The unsafe system may perform undesired actions, and we must both detect and address those actions performed by many peripheral devices including a desktop PC, smart phone, or lightweight tablet PC. Dependable logs for both unintentional errors and intentional issues become more important as complexity within the system increases. We leave this topic for a future paper.

6. Device classification

This paper has highlighted many security issues within an insulin pump system. Recent research [16] has shown similar issues in cardiac devices. We envision that future medical device security research will fall into different device classes that partition the medical device system. These classes align well with the FDA's device classes.

Device classification may be done differently for *security* purposes, and the primary factor is how the device is used by the patient. In this sense, those devices that are completely implanted and not physically accessible externally belong to class III, and examples include pacemakers, internal cardiac defibrillators, and neurostimulators. Devices that are implanted but external to the body form class II, and this includes infusion pumps. Another class, class

I, is those devices that are completely external to the body but are still considered to be part of the system; this includes blood glucose monitors, mobile phones, and personal computers.

We claim that device interactions with these atypical class I medical device system components constitutes risk and may need closer scrutiny. Because the classes are associated with different regulatory burdens, we anticipate that faster but effective regulatory examination will be needed. In the future, based on the system's complexity from interactions within different components, this class may need sub-classes based on the device's interaction and safety implications from those system interactions.

7. Conclusion

Insulin pump systems have continually incorporated new components which have greatly benefitted patients including continuous glucose monitors and wireless remote programmers. In the future new devices including automobiles, watches, clocks, beds, and exercise equipment are all viable devices for inclusion (while phones may be adopted more, they are already a part of insulin pump system therapy). The resulting complexity makes security and safety analysis more difficult. We recommend a cautious approach to adopting these new devices as their impact on patient safety is not well understood.

Device miniaturization and commercialization of an artificial pancreas may soon result in new approaches to system design. As sensors and pumps grow smaller, decreasing computational and power resources can affect the security architecture. Engineers are working to make these new architectures safe and secure both now and in the future.

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9. Tables

Availability	To uphold safety, the system must be able to respond according to its specification and design. An insulin pump system should remain available to its user at all times.
Confidentiality	Data is knowable to only the intended parties. Patient information and system data should remain secret to unauthorized third parties.
Integrity	Data cannot be undetectably altered. All system data that can affect patient treatment must not be altered without the patient's knowledge.
Authentication	Only authorized parties or components should be able to act as a more trusted user of the system (i.e., allowed privileged access).
Authorization	Certain authorized subject's actions must be verified before execution.

Table 1: Insulin Pump Key Security Properties

10. Figures



Figure 1: Insulin Pump System

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Abbreviations: blood glucose monitor (BGM), continuous glucose monitor (CGM), personal computer (PC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Keywords: security, privacy, safety, wireless, communication, integrity

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