Automatic Formal Verification for EPICS

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Hospital-based cyclotron and neutron radiation therapy
We must ensure that we satisfy this overall safety requirement:

- The neutron beam can only turn on or remain on when the machine setup matches a prescription that has been selected by the operator.

This overall requirement is composed of hundreds of detailed requirements, for example:

- The actual gantry angle must match the prescribed angle within a given tolerance, when the machine is in therapy mode and that setting has not been overridden and . . .

These requirements cannot be checked with relays or PLCs. General purpose computing in high-level languages is unavoidable.
Is it advisable to build a safety-critical system with EPICS? Some conventional wisdom says no:

2008: “(EPICS) code is not rigorously audited to the standards ... that would be needed (for medical applications). ...”
epics/tech-talk/2008/msg00803.php

Response: We reviewed and tested EPICS code ourselves.

2012: “EPICS should never be relied on for safety-critical operations ...”
epics/tech-talk/2012/msg01836.php

Response: We use a subset of EPICS in a restricted style.
Using EPICS with confidence in safety-critical applications

Three related topics:

- Selecting an EPICS subset and a restricted programming style
- New tool for finding errors in EPICS databases (applications)
- New tool for testing EPICS core (runtime)
Control Program: Limiting Complexity (1)

EPICS architecture:

- Embedded computers with EPICS runtime, called *IOCs*
- Application programs on IOCs, called *databases*
- User interface, database access etc. provided by separate *Client* programs running on different computers
- IOCs and clients communicate using *Channel Access (CA)* network protocol

Therapy control application architecture:

- Therapy control program runs on one IOC
- Therapy IOC alone executes control laws, achieves and maintains safe state
- Clients and CA are only used to make progress. For example, select and load prescription
- Do not depend on clients or CA for control laws or safety

Clients and CA not considered in our formal analyses and tools
Select an EPICS subset and use a restricted programming style. Just enough to support data flow from inputs to outputs:

- Only database records, StreamDevice .proto files, st.cmd
- No SNL, no subroutine records, no custom device support
- Database DB links only, no CA links
- Data flow is all “push” from inputs to outputs: SCAN PASSIVE, INPx NPP, OUT PP, FLNK
- 19 record types: acalcout ai ao asyn bi bo calc calcout dfanout fanout longin longout mbbo scalcout seq stringin stringout subArray waveform

Our formal analyses and tools only consider these.
The **EPICS Symbolic Interpreter** is a new tool for finding errors in EPICS databases (application programs). Similar role to unit testing, but considers all possible input values.

**Inputs:**
- EPICS database: `.db .substitutions .template st.cmd`
- Property that relates PVs before and after processing:
  \[
  \text{actual gantry} \neq \text{prescribed gantry} \Rightarrow \text{interlock set}
  \]

**Output:** *
- everything is ok! – property is satisfied – or:
  - Counterexample: PVs with values that violate property –
    \[
    \text{Iso:GantryCouch:Gantry:Prescribed.VAL} = 312
    \]
    \[
    \text{Iso:GantryCouch:Gantry:Actual.VAL} = 48 \ldots
    \]
  - Log: processing along counterexample data flow path

Now in use, found serious errors missed by reviews and testing
Similar role to unit testing, *but* —

Testing:

- You try to guess an input value that violates the assertion.
- Passing tests are *not conclusive*, a different value might have failed.

Symbolic interpreter:

- Tool finds an input value that violates the assertion, if there is one.
- Verified properties are *conclusive*, all possible values are checked.

The symbolic interpreter can check all values because it considers CALC fields as symbolic formulas.
The *EPICS Trace Verifier* is a new tool for testing the EPICS runtime.

Does the EPICS runtime behave as we expect?

The trace verifier uses a *formal semantics* we derived from the EPICS Record Reference Manual (RRM).

The formal semantics is a new implementation of EPICS in a specialized programming language.

The trace verifier checks if a sample of IOC behavior is consistent with our formal semantics.
We compare of three things:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{?} & \text{?} \\
\text{EPICS RRM} & = & \text{Formal semantics} = \text{EPICS code} \\
\text{manual} & \text{(review RRM)} & \text{automatic} \text{(trace verifier)}
\end{array}
\]

We can revise the formal semantics.
We observe discrepancies found by the trace verifier.
EPICS Trace Verifier (3)

Checked traces from over 20 million randomly generated IOCs
No crashes, no outright errors where RRM makes a false statement.

Found two kinds of discrepancies:

- Our misreadings of the RRM
- Omissions, ambiguities in the RRM

Example omissions, ambiguities:

- `dfanout` (etc.) OMSL default is *supervisory*, not *closed_loop*
- `calcout` with `DOPT = On Change` considers `inf ≠ inf`, contrary to IEEE754
- `seq` uses callbacks even if all delays are zero. Callbacks might interleave with other records processing.
- `calc` etc. write from `INPA` to `A` before processing `INPB` (etc.). Observable if later input links refer to earlier fields (etc.)

None of these omissions or ambiguities affect our control program.
We can use EPICS with confidence in safety-critical applications.

We have demonstrated —

- Successful use of restricted EPICS in a safety-critical application
- Tool that finds errors in EPICS databases using exhaustive analysis
- Testing of the EPICS runtime against the RRM finds ambiguities and omissions, but no crashes or outright errors.