

Magnetic Ads: Fooling GUI Agents Using Malicious Embedded Content

Sela Navot



Introduction

GUI-based web agents browse like humans—by analyzing screenshots, not HTML. Screenshots are easier for humans (and agents) to interpret.

But… even on trusted websites, screenshots can include third-party content like ads, user posts, or product photos.

Can third parties with use embedded content in trustworthy sites trick GUI agents?

Humans fall for such attacks. Which attacks do AI agents fall for?

We show that it is easy to fool agent's visual grounding step, which attempts to identify where elements are. We make it believe that key page elements are within an adversary-controlled advertisement.

Figure 1: excerpt from the HTML source of amazon.com. It is hard to understand.



Figure 2: a GUI from softsonic.com. Intuitive to use, and contain a malicious 3rd party ad.

Attacker Goal and Threat Model

Attacker Objective: cause the grounding / object detection step to believe that the important page elements are within the adversary-controlled advertisement.

Attacker Capabilities: Complete control an embedded advertisement, but absolutely ***no control*** over the rest of the page.

Motivation: There is a long history of attackers luring humans into clicking malicious links in trustworthy sites using deceptive ads (e.g. for malware, phishing, scams, clickjacking).

Impact: If GUI-agents become popular, reliable attacking them would scale such threats dramatically.

Warm Up: Fooling Agents Like We Fool Humans

In this attack, we use an advertisements that imitate legitimate webpage elements (similar to Figure 2). We executed this attack on proprietary state of the art models, using only black-box queries.

The examples in Figure 3 where all found within 5 queries to the model and successfully fooled it three out of three times.



Figure 3: Advertisements embedded into screenshots from slickdeals.net, which successfully fooled Google's Gemini 2.5 Flash, OpenAI's ChatGPT-4o, and Ai2's Molmo when used for visual grounding.

Main Attack: Fools Agents but Invisible to Humans

We demonstrate that adversaries can fool GUI-grounders in an attack that is invisible to humans. This also likely evades current filters by hosts that attempt to block malicious ads.

On the downside, it requires white-box access to the model, including the ability to compute gradients.

Attack Target Model

Due to compute constraint, we chose to show a proof of concept on a small model. We expect our techniques to generalize to larger models.

We used the YOLO version 8 Nano, which we fine tuned to detect webpage elements in the websites where we tested our attack, using a custom dataset of 50 screenshots.

The target model achieved a validation success rate of 100% on these elements on these websites.

How We Generated Adversarial Perturbations

We start with a normal ad $\mathcal{A}$, embedded in a page $\mathcal{W}$. We then modify $\mathcal{A}$ slightly so that the model thinks it contain some important page element.

At a high level, we do the following:

1. Create a fake ground-truth saying that the target element is in $\mathcal{A}$.
2. Compute the loss of the models output with respect to the fake label, and the gradient.
3. Adjust the pixels within A in the direction opposite the gradient.
4. Ensure updated pixel values are still close to the values in the original photo.
5. Repeat for many epochs.

Algorithm 1 Invisible Perturbation on an Advertisement

Input: Grounding model M, webpage screenshot W, target element E, ad region A, step size ϵ, max perturbation δ, number of epochs N.

```
Create a fake label ℓ_fake stating that E is in A
Let W_0 ← W                                   ▷ Store original image
for i = 1 to N do
    out ← M(W)
    loss ← Loss(out, ℓ_fake)
    gradient ← ∇_W(loss)
    for all pixel channels p in A do
        p_new ← p − ε · sign(gradient at p)
        p_0 ← W_0 at p
        p_new ← clip(p_new, p_0 − δ, p_0 + δ)
        Update p in W with p_new
return perturbed webpage W
```



Figure 4: The model output before the attack, after the attack, and a visualization of the perturbations that we applied (absolute pixel change, $\times$ 10)

Results

On a laptop machine with only a CPU, a malicious ad that works well can be generated within 100 epochs that take about a minute.

The resulting advertisement is surprisingly robust and works when embedded in all websites we tried (with comparable success) in various parts of the page, making the attack scalable.

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This project satisfies a requirement for Ranjay Krishna's course "Deep Learning."

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